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Abstract
We exploit the regional variation in negative attitudes towards immi-
grants to Sweden in order to analyse the consequences of the attitudes
on immigrantswelfare. We nd that attitudes towards immigrants are
of importance: they both a¤ect their labour market outcomes and their
quality of life. We interpret the negative e¤ect on wages as evidence of
labour market discrimination. We estimate the welfare e¤ects of negative
attitudes, through their wage and local amenities, for immigrants with
di¤erent levels of skills, origin, gender and age.
Keywords: Attitudes towards immigration, Geographical Mobility,
Wages, Amenities.
JEL classications: J15, J31, J61, J71
1 Introduction
Sweden has gone from being a land of emigration to a land of immigration.
Immigration was insignicant until World War II. During the rst post-war
decades, there was a sharp increase in demand for labour and workers were re-
cruited from other European countries. These early labour immigrants adapted
fairly well and gradually became accepted in the cities where they settled. Since
the 1970s, when the need for labour shrank substantially, immigration to Sweden
has become increasingly restricted to political refugees and their families. No
other a­ uent nation in recent decades has accepted as many political refugees,
per capita, as Sweden has. The share of foreign-born reached 15% in 2010,
about half of them from non developed countries.
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Recently, many studies have detected the existence of negative attitudes to-
wards immigrants.1 For example, the SOM-institute (Gothemburg University)
has investigated attitudes towards immigration and refugees since 1986 and
found growing resistance against receiving refugees until 1992, while thereafter
the attitude has slowly been more generous. But, in 2005, still nearly half the
population thought that it was a good suggestion to receive fewer refugees in
Sweden. Studies making a comparison across European countries, for exam-
ple Card et. al. (2005), nd that Sweden is one of the countries with the most
generous attitudes towards immigrants. Therefore, if we nd any e¤ect, then
immigrantswelfare potentially is even more a¤ected in other countries.
Do these attitudes matter? Or is it just something people say but never
act upon? We explore if actual discrimination is related to negative attitudes
towards immigrants. If attitudes do not inuence the immigrantswelfare, then
they are no indication of discrimination and may be less of a concern.
The aim of this paper is to exploit the regional variation in negative atti-
tudes towards immigrants in order to analyse whether the mobility decisions and
the labour market outcomes of immigrants are a¤ected by such attitudes. We
recognize that not every native with negative attitudes may discriminate, but
we conjecture negative attitudes to be systematically related to discrimination.
We develop a simple model that describes how discrimination a¤ects immi-
grants when they are capable of forming networks. In this model, rms choose
their optimal number of employees using two methods of search: they either ad-
vertise or nd workers through networking. We nd that more severe negative
attitudes reduce immigrant wages and amenities, and that the impact on wages
is weaker the more immigrants present in a region, through the networking ef-
fect. We also nd that more immigration directly increases immigrantswages
through a networking e¤ect, as well as their amenities.
In the empirical analysis, we can disregard the immigrantsinitial geograph-
ical sorting by concentrating on a group of immigrants for which there is an ex-
ogenous source of variation in their rst location in Sweden, given by a refugee
settlement policy pursued by the government. We study the movements from
this rst location as indication of better labour market conditions and/or bet-
ter quality of life. We take into account the fact that the immigrants are not a
homogeneous group by considering various kinds of heterogeneity, by origin, by
level of education, by gender and by age. The placement of refugees in a region
may exacerbate negative attitudes towards them, therefore we consider data on
attitudes measured prior to the refugee settlement policy.
Identication fails if some other factor that we are not considering determines
both the level of attitudes, the share of immigrants and the di¤erences in wages
and quality of life in the region. We test this by including a placebo group in
1Some examples are the Intolerance Report (Intolerans 2004) and Westin (2000).
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our analysis, immigrants from developed countries, that we expect be very little
a¤ected by attitudes. The idea is that if our estimation of the e¤ect of attitudes
on wages and amenities is the result of some other factor that produces lower
wages, we should estimate the same e¤ect on this placebo group.
In a nutshell, we nd that attitudes towards immigrants are of importance
for the refugees, but they have no e¤ect on the wages or quality of life of immi-
grants from developed countries. The location pattern of refugees shows that
their quality of life is lower when attitudes are more negative towards them. A
reduction of negative attitudes from the average value to zero increases their
quality of life by an equivalent of 10% of their wages. Immigrants also receive
lower wages when attitudes are more negative. The same reduction in negative
attitudes would allow them to obtain 5% higher wages.
We begin by forcing the coe¢ cients in the wage equation to be the same
for those refugees that stayed where they had been placed (stayers) and those
who moved. Then we allow these coe¢ cients to vary and observe that the
e¤ect on wages is only present for the movers. Some individual characteristics,
for example the type of education or occupation, may determine that some
individuals are more vulnerable to discrimination than others. More vulnerable
individuals, being more a¤ected by negative attitudes, are also more likely to
move if they have been placed in municipalities with high negative attitudes.
Reducing negative attitudes towards immigrants from the mean value to zero
would increase the moverswelfare by an equivalent of 17% of their wages, while
the stayers only benet from an equivalent of 10% of their wages via amenities.
When we take heterogeneity into account, we see that the e¤ect on wages
is present for well educated, female, older refugees and for those coming from
Eastern Europe and Asia. Well educated movers would have 18% higher wages
if negative attitudes decreased from the mean value to zero. Our interpretation
is that some of these well educated immigrants may be performing jobs below
their skill levels if they live in a municipality with very negative attitudes.
We acknowledge the fact that the residuals of the amenities and wage equa-
tions in the municipality of placement are positively correlated to the residuals
of the amenities and wages equations in the target municipality if the refugee
moves. If an individual has high wages given his or her observed characteristics
at placement, the individual is very likely to have a high wage after moving.
We incorporate various alternative correlations in residuals and the e¤ect of
attitudes on wages and amenities is very little a¤ected.
Related Research
Our paper relates to research on the discrimination of immigrants in the labour
market, migration decisions and, in particular, empirical research about Sweden.
In a companion paper, Larsen and Waisman (2008), we introduce labour
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market discrimination in a search model where rms cannot direct their search
to natives or immigrants. Discrimination in that paper is supposed to take place
on entry, while it takes place on exit in this paper.
Our setting relates both to research on individuals migration decisions
(Sjaastad (1962)) and self-selection (Roy (1951)). Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980)
and Borjas et. al. (1992) apply Roys self-selection framework to internal mi-
gration. Other studies analyse the internal migration decision in Scandinavia.
Åslund (2001) nds that immigrants to Sweden are attracted to regions with
many immigrants, better labour market opportunities and many welfare recip-
ients. Damm and Rosholm (2005) nd that the hazard rate into the rst job of
refugee immigrants to Denmark is decreasing in the local population size and
the local share of immigrants and that geographical mobility had large posi-
tive e¤ects on the hazard rate into rst job thus suggesting that restrictions
on placed refugeessubsequent out-migration would hamper the labour market
integration of refugees. None of these studies considers the e¤ect of di¤erent
attitudes towards immigrants on their migration decision.
Henry (2008) shows that the probability of African American migrants choos-
ing a city in the US is signicantly reduced by the level of race-based crimes
against them and by racially intolerant attitudes held by whites and the poor
evolution of the feelings of whites about racial diversity. In her analysis, she
does not study how attitudes a¤ect labour market outcomes.
Knabe et al (2009) analyse the e¤ects of right-wing extremism on the well-
being of immigrants in Germany. They nd that the higher vote shares for the
extreme right are associated with a lower subjective well-being of immigrants.
Moreover, educated immigrants are more strongly a¤ected by right-wing atti-
tudes of the host population than low-skilled immigrants. As compared to our
paper, this study uses a di¤erent measure of right-wing attitudes in the native
population and a subjective measure of life satisfaction as they cannot infer
quality of life from migration decisions.
Several empirical studies (for example Bevelander and Skyt Nielsen (1999)
and Arai et. al. (1999)) have found lower income and employment rates for
immigrants than for comparable natives in Sweden. These studies cannot tell us
if the di¤erences are caused by ethnic discrimination or di¤erences in unobserved
characteristics of the two populations. By analysing the di¤erence in labour
market outcomes in regions with di¤erent attitudes towards immigrants, we
intend to test discrimination in a more direct way.
Other studies perform di¤erent types of more direct tests of discrimination
in Sweden (Rooth (2001), Åslund and Rooth (2005)). These studies focus on
the labour market outcomes of certain groups of immigrants, while we consider
that attitudes may a¤ect their migration decision as well.
In the next section, we present a simple model guiding our empirical analysis.
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2 The Model
We consider a search and matching model where natives and immigrants search
for jobs and rms search for workers. For simplicity, we assume that rms may
supply vacancies directed towards immigrants or natives.2 When describing a
job, it is possible to indicate the preferences against immigrant workers, for
example, by demanding excellent native language knowledge. On the contrary,
some job descriptions explicitly stress the appreciation of cultural diversity. We
will describe the full model for jobs directed to immigrants only.
We incorporate two additional features into the model. First, workers can
use not only formal methods of search, but also their social networks (friends and
acquaintances) to get a job. Second, immigrants are subject to discrimination in
the labour market by individuals with negative attitudes towards immigration.
We assume the presence of negative attitudes towards immigrants in a region
increases the separation rate of immigrant workers from the rm. The rm
opening a vacancy does not know if discrimination will take place, it only knows
that immigrants have a higher separation rate caused by random negative shocks
to the preferences of co-workers, clients, etc. The shock is thus considered a
sudden irrational behaviour, in the sense that it is not a decision which requires
any optimization from the rm or the workers point of view. As a consequence,
the worker may be red or may voluntarily quit when the discomfort caused by
discrimination is strong enough.3
2.1 Matching
We follow Fontaine (2007) setting up a simple search and matching model includ-
ing social networks. We assume that rms advertise vacancies VI directed to im-
migrants, unemployment is given by uI ; there are LI employees, and the labour
market tightness faced by immigrants is given by I = (VI+ILI)=uI . The tran-
sition rate for an unemployed immigrant is given by f (I) = 1 e I , and for the
rm it is q (I) =
 
1  e I  =I where f 0 (I) = e I > 0, f 00 (I) =  e I < 0,
q0 (I) < 0 and q00 (I) > 0:
2 In Larsen & Waisman (2008) we assume that it is not possible for rms to supply vacan-
cies directed towards immigrants or natives. Therefore, any negative impact on immigrants
through vacancy supply, will also a¤ect natives. The simplifying assumption in this paper
allows us to ignore e¤ects on nativeswages which is not the focus of the present analysis.
3 In Larsen & Waisman (2008), we assume discrimination takes place in the matching
process instead (both alternatives are simplications) and provide a justication for the mech-
anism through which discrimination is assumed to a¤ect immigrants.
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2.2 The Firm
The rm chooses the number of vacancies o¤ered to immigrants so as to max-
imize prots subject to negative attitudes towards immigrants and networking
e¤ects. Each immigrant worker produces y and receives the bargained wage,
wI . A rm chooses the optimal number of vacancies to advertise, VI taking into
account that its employees also produce new applicants. Each rm h in munic-
ipality j facing immigrants therefore solves the following Bellman equation
jI

LjI

= max
Vn
[yLjih   wjnLjih   kyV jih + _jI

Ljih

] (1)
st _LjIh =

jILih + V
j
Ih

q

jI

  s  1 + ajLjIh; (2)
Networking happens at the rate jILihf (I) ; where we assume that 
j
I =
mIj .  is the discount rate, s is the rate by which jobs are destroyed and aj is
the rate determining how negative people in a region are against immigrants.
Matches between immigrants and the rm are dissolved more often the higher
negative attitudes towards immigration are. With identical rms, using (1)-(2)
and Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we obtain the non-trivial solution in steady state
determining labour market tightness, I :
ky
q

jI
 = y   wjI
+ s (1 + aj)  jIq

jI
 :
2.3 The worker
Let U jI be the present discounted value facing an unemployed immigrant and E
j
I
be the present discounted value facing an employed immigrant, where j = t; p
denotes either the target municipality the worker considers moving to, t; or the
municipality where he or she has been placed, p:
U jI = Q
j
I + f

jI

EjI   U jI

; j = t; p; (3)
EjI = Q
j
I + w
j
I + s
 
1 + aj
 
U jI   EjI

; j = t; p; (4)
where QjI is the quality of life or amenities the immigrant enjoys in a certain
municipality. Negative attitudes towards immigration induce discrimination in
housing, schools, hospitals, streets that reduce the quality of life of immigrants,
so dQjI=da
j < 0: Living in a region with a large share of immigrant may o¤er
benets such as a larger availability of services and goods oriented towards
immigrants (for example food), networks that could help recent immigrants
nd housing, etc. These factors increase the quality of life of immigrants living
in a region implying that dQjI=dI
j > 0.
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Wages are determined by Nash bargaining and we assume that the bar-
gaining power is a half, so that XjI = E
j
I   U jI ; where XjI =

ky=q

jI

=
y wjI
+s jIq(jI)
giving that ky = XjI q

jI

and thereby we obtain
wjI = 0:5

1 +

jI + 
j
I

k

y: (5)
The labour market tightness faced by immigrants jI is determined by:
2k
 
+ s
 
1 + aj

=

1  jIk + jIk

q

jI

; (6)
More severe negative attitudes, aj ; j = t; p reduces the attractiveness of
opening a vacancy such that labour market tightness falls and thereby immi-
grants face lower wages. The opposite is true for more networking, jI :
4
2.4 Mobility
We assume for simplicity that only unemployed immigrants make a migration
choice. When individuals decide whether to stay in the region of placement or
not, they compare the value of staying as an unemployed worker to the value
of moving, taking into account mobility costs. Immigrants have heterogeneous
mobility costs5 that are assumed to be uniformly distributed, cI 2 (0; 1). Work-
ers with high mobility costs nd it too costly to move, whereas low mobility
costs workers nd it more than worthwhile to do so. The marginal immigrant
is dened as having mobility costs c^I which makes him or her just indi¤erent
between moving or staying where the worker has been placed. The condition
determining the moving costs of the marginal worker is
U tI   c^I = UpI : (7)
As wages are endogenous we can use equations (3)-(4), (7), the wage equation
(5) and the free entry condition which gives the following condition 
QtI  QpI

=ky + tI   pI = c^I= (ky) : (8)
Equation (8) gives c^I as a function of the endogenous variable 
t
I and 
p
I . The
higher the di¤erence in labour market tightness, which captures both wages and
employment probability di¤erences, the more people will move. This is captured
4The same equations for natives would be wjN = 0:5

1 +

jN + 
j
N

k

y and
2k (+ s) =

1  jNk + jNk

q

jN

: These equations would also be valid for any group
that is not much a¤ected by negative attitudes towards immigration, such as the immigrants
from developed countries.
5Mobility costs depend on factors such as family situation, age, education level, etc.
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by a higher threshold cost for the marginal immigrant, c^I ; because if mobility
is more advantageous, then workers are willing to pay higher costs of moving.
If two regions, t and p are identical in terms of equal labour market tightness
and amenities, then no one will move between these two regions.
3 More negative attitudes
When attitudes become more negative, aj increases, then we obtain a negative
impact on labour market tightness facing immigrants
djI=da
j = k2s=

 kq

jI

+

1  jIk + jIk

q0

jI

< 0:
More severe negative attitudes reduce the expected duration of a match,
which makes it less attractive for a rm to open a vacancy. Immigrantsem-
ployment chances therefore fall. The impact is weaker the higher the fraction of
immigrants and thus networking, (
d2jI)
(dajdIj) =  
k2sq0(jI)km
( kq(jI)+(1 jIk+jIk)q0(jI))
2 > 0.
This is the case as more networking makes it easier for a rm to nd a worker.
Furthermore, the fall in the vacancy supply reduces the bargaining power of an
immigrant worker, such that immigrant wages are indirectly a¤ected, through
the impact on labour market tightness, hence dwI=da = 0:5ky (dI=da) < 0.
Workers in regions with more severe negative attitudes are therefore willing to
work for a lower wage, as they face a lower probability of nding a job than
a similar worker in a region with more positive attitudes towards immigrants.
This negative wage e¤ect is going to modify the negative impact of negative
attitudes on job opportunities, but the total impact is negative.
Regarding mobility we have the result that as more severe negative attitude
in a region reduces employment chances and wages, captured in the equation
by reduced labour market tightness and amenities, mobility into that region
falls, dc^
n
=dat = dQtI=da
t + ky
 
dt
I
=dat

< 0. Immigrants thus tend to move
away from regions with more severely negative attitudes, both due to a direct
reduction of the quality of life, but also due to the lower employment changes
and corresponding wages.
4 More immigrants
More immigration will induce the fraction of immigrants to increase and thereby
networking, which causes labour market tightness to increase, that is, djI=dI
j =
 mkq

jI

=

 kq

jI

+

1  jIk + jIk

q0

jI

> 0. Networking has both
a direct and an indirect positive impact on wages facing immigrants, and hence
dwjI=dI
j =

djI=dI
j +m

0:5ky > 0. More immigrants around leads to more
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hiring through networking causing immigrants to face better employment chances,
which increases their bargaining power and results in higher wages.
This e¤ect then implies that more immigrants move into regions where the
fraction of immigrants is higher, together with a potentially positive direct im-
pact on amenities, dc^n=dI
t = dQtI=dI
t + ky
 
dt
I
=dIt

> 0.
In the next section we will describe the empirical background, data and
method which will allow us to examine the impact of immigrant welfare through
both the impact on their employment chances and thereby wages and their
amenities and moving decisions.
5 Empirical Background, Data and Method
Immigrantssorting is based on both observable and unobservable factors which
makes it generally di¢ cult to study the e¤ect of negative attitudes on labour
market outcomes and migration decisions. We will study a group of immigrants
for which there is an exogenous source of variation in their rst location in Swe-
den given by a refugee settlement policy pursued by the government from 1985
to 1994. The movement from this rst location is considered to be endogenous
in our analysis and provides information about the quality of life immigrants
enjoy in di¤erent regions and their cost of moving.
The refugee settlement policy placed newly arrived refugees in di¤erent lo-
cal municipalities according to certain well-dened criteria. The idea of the
programme was to get a more even distribution of immigrants and facilitate
integration. There was no interaction between municipal o¢ cers and refugees,
so the selection was, by denition, purely made on basis of observed character-
istics, such as family size. Edin, Fredriksson and Åslund (2003) argue that the
fact that the assignment of municipality was not the immigrantschoice and was
independent of unobserved individual characteristics gives a quasi-experimental
character to the data. There were no restrictions on ex post mobility, except
that the refugees lost some activities granted in an introduction programme.
We recognize that the placement of immigrants in a region may exacerbate
negative attitudes towards them. This problem is addressed by considering the
data on attitudes measured prior to the refugee settlement policy. For this
reason, we assume attitudes to be constant in the short run. There is, to our
knowledge, no data available on the evolution of municipal attitudes towards
immigrants over time, so we cannot directly test this assumption. Still, it is
not clear that receiving more refugees should increase the populations negative
attitudes towards immigration. Di¤erent theories predict that greater day-to-
day contact with immigrants may either increase or decrease the perceived threat
posed by immigrants. At the national level, the attitudes towards immigration
have become less negative in Sweden between 1990 and 2004, while the number
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of foreign born individuals living in Sweden increased by more than 30%.6
5.1 Data
Data on the labour market performance of immigrants is available in the Lon-
gitudinal Individual Data Base (LINDA) stored at Statistics Sweden. Income
registers and population census data constitute the core of the data set.7 It
contains information on 300,000 individuals annually plus a non-overlapping
sample of 20% of all immigrants. From this database, we obtain information
about the immigrants monthly wage,8 country of origin, year of immigration,
the municipality where he or she lived upon arrival and where the person lives
now, its level of education, age, civil status, etc. We use an unbalanced panel
of data from 1996 (two years after the latest arrivals) and 2003.
We cannot observe which immigrants in LINDA are refugees, so we restrict
the analysis to the countries from which most refugees came while the refugee
settlement policy was pursued. Table I lists the origin of 99.2% of the accepted
refugees in the period 1990 - 1994,9 that is, those immigrants who were granted
residence permits according to the Genève convention, de facto refugees, persons
in need of protection, humanitarian reasons and special refugee quota.10
In this period almost 23,500 immigrants were granted residence permits as
refugees on average every year. But many more, around 40,000 individuals,
came as asylum seekers from the countries in our sample per year and may have
received residence permits in later years. 62.7% of the immigrants from the
countries in our sample that received residence permit were refugees.
Immigrants also received residence permits for family reunion and labour
market reasons. Only 64 out of the 218 immigrants who received residence
permit for labour market reasons per year came from the countries in our sample.
The labour market immigrants came mainly from the UK, Germany, Poland,
China, USA, former Yugoslavia, Holland and Japan.
6 In 1993, 52% of the respondents to the Swedish Opinion survey completely agreed with the
statement There are too many foreigners in Swedenand 25% with I would not like having
an immigrant from another part of the world married into my family. By 2004 the shares
had gone down to 42% and 15% respectively. Hjerm (2009) concludes in a sociological study
in Sweden that a recent inux of immigrants to the municipality does not matter for levels of
anti-immigrant attitudes. Similarly, Card et al (2005) nds a negative relation between higher
immigrant stocks and the fraction of people who want to restrict immigration in Europe, but
the relationship is not statistically signicant.
7See Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for a presentation of this data set.
8Until 1998, the data on full-time equivalent monthly wage rates was not available for all
private sector employees, while it covered all public employees incorporated in this sample.
9We do not have this data separated for the period 84-89, only the total gures for 80-89.
10The countries in our sample are: former Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ethiopia,
Somalia, Uganda, Cuba, Chile, Peru, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, China, Lebanon,
Sri Lanka, Syria, Turkey and Palestina.
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The remaining 37.1% of the residence permits in our sample allowed families
to reunite. The immigrants receiving permits for family reunion reasons came
mainly from former Yugoslavia, Iran, Turkey, Poland, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon,
Thailand, USA, Ethiopia, UK, Chile, Philippines, Vietnam and Germany. Dur-
ing this period, 40% of the immigrants coming to Sweden for family reunion
reasons (from any country of origin) were joining a refugee. This share is likely
to be much larger for those coming from the countries in our sample. When the
family joins an immigrant that came to Sweden as a refugee and was placed by
the government, it will be indirectly a¤ected by the placement as well.
Our sample contains 3,300 individuals that arrived in the period 1985 - 1994.
Their distribution by country of origin is di¤erent, so we control for the number
of asylum seekers coming from the same country in all regressions. We refer to
them as refugees even if some may be their families and a few may be labour
market immigrants or have joined a non-refugee family.
We will repeat the analysis on a group of immigrants arriving in the same
period from developed countries, that is, countries in the OECD at that point
in time (except for Turkey) as a placebo. This group of immigrants is unlikely
to be as a¤ected by negative attitudes as refugees are. The advantage of using
this group instead of natives as a placebo is, that they are more similar in the
sense of not knowing the language and culture so well when they arrive.
We obtain our measure of attitudes towards immigrants from ve cross-
sectional surveys on Swedish Opinion collected from 1979 to February 1985 by
Stiftelsen för Opinionsanalyser (SSD 0099, Göteborg University). The data was
collected through a mail survey sent to around 2,000 individuals aged 17-80. We
add the answers of all surveys to get more observations per municipality, all in all
11,539 answers. We are interested in the question: How important do you think
less immigration is? The possible answers (frequency in parenthesis) are: (1)
very important (25.75%), (2) quite important (23.45%), (3) not very important
(11.35%), (4) not important at all (ne now) (17.69%), (5) better with more
immigrants (3.13%), (6) hesitant (13.83%) and (7) no answer (4.80%).
We construct a measure of negative attitudes by adding the number of indi-
viduals answering (1) or (2) and deducting those answering (5).11 This variable
is normalized to vary between 0 and 1. A map of Sweden in Figure 1 shows how
attitudes are distributed throughout the country.
We obtain from Statistics Sweden the following municipal characteristics:
open unemployment, the share of income originating in the private sector (mar-
ket support), the share of rms with less than 50 employees (share of small
rms), the share of well educated inhabitants (dened as those with more than
high-school education) in the population and the municipal tax rates. The geo-
11We have tried alternative measures, such as just adding (1) and (2), with no signicant
changes in the results.
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graphic characteristics included in the analysis are the latitude (that inuences
how dark it becomes in winter) and the ten-year average minimum temperature
in the winter (January to March).
Table II includes descriptive statistics of the variables of interest in our study.
These include individual characteristics of the immigrants and the characteris-
tics of the municipality where immigrants live and where they were placed. 45%
of the immigrants in our sample stayed where they had been placed. The stay-
ers constitute 62% of Latin Americans, 45% of the Asians, 42% of the East
Europeans and only 38% of the Africans. Low educated stayed more often than
well educated were they had been placed (48% vs 40%) and women more often
than men (47% vs 43%). We will allow in our study for heterogeneity in the
immigrant group, dividing it by origin, education, gender and age.
If we compare the municipalities of placement, we observe that movers were
placed in municipalities with more negative attitudes, lower share of immigrants
from non developed countries, lower share of well educated individuals, lower
market support, lower share of small rms, higher municipal tax rates, lower
average temperature in winter and larger latitude. When they move, they choose
less negative attitudes, larger share of immigrants, lower unemployment, larger
share of well educated population, more market support, larger share of small
rms, lower municipal tax rates, warmer weather and brighter winters.
These are the factors we will consider as determining the quality of life and
cost of moving of immigrants. These factors a¤ect wages as well, we only exclude
the geographic conditions from the wage equations. The migration decisions of
immigrants suggested by these means are consistent with our theory. But this
is just a comparison of means; we need a deeper analysis of the data to measure
the e¤ect of negative attitudes.
5.2 Empirical Strategy
We initiate the analysis by performing a probit regression to analyse how the
variables of interest (negative attitudes towards immigration and share of immi-
grants from non developed countries) a¤ect the probability that an immigrant
stays where the individual has been placed. We control for all the individual
and municipal characteristics described in table II. We cannot control for xed
e¤ects at the individual level because very few individuals in our sample moved
during 1996 - 2003.12 Neither can we control for xed e¤ects at the municipal
level since attitudes are assumed to be constant over time. We will control for
xed e¤ects at the labour market area level. The division of the 290 municipal-
ities into 70 labour market areas is built by Statistics Sweden based on actual
commuting conditions. The pattern and intensity of commuting ows decide
12Most refugees that moved did so relatively soon after placement.
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how the municipalities are combined into these labour market areas. Labour
market areas are a good unit for controlling for similar labour market condi-
tions that are constant over time. We control for time trends by including year
e¤ects.
Second, we study the e¤ect of the variables of interest on the wages of the
immigrants. The refugee placement policy provides us with an exogenous rst
location in the country. We begin by studying the wages of those refugees who
chose to stay where placed. As we have already seen that the decision to move is
a¤ected by the variables of interest, we need to correct for the bias introduced by
considering only stayers. To apply the sample selection procedure of Heckman
(1979) to the panel data, we estimate the probability of staying where placed for
each year separately and obtain eight inverse Mills ratios that are incorporated
into the wage equation. We include the same controls as in the probit regressions
except for the geographic conditions.
Until now we have ignored the information we have on the moverswages. We
can actually make use of all the information we have by studying the migration
decision directly and that is what we do in the third step of our analysis. In
this way we exploit the fact that the refugees were exogenously placed by the
government in their rst location and then some of them chose to move providing
us with additional information about their preferences by their new location
choice. We study the migration decision for individual i given by equation (8): 
Qti  Qpi

+
 
t
i
(wti(a
t; tI))  pi (wpi (ap; pI))

ky > ci; then i moves, 
Qti  Qpi

+
 
t
i
(wti(a
t; tI))  pi (wpi (ap; pI))

ky < ci; then i stays,
where we acknowledge that labour market tightness, j
i
; is positively correlated
with wages, wji
13 . For movers we know where they were placed (p) and where
they moved afterwards (t). But we cannot observe to which municipality a stayer
considered moving. The target municipality of stayers is dened as the average
municipality where all immigrants that were placed in a given municipality are
living in 2003. This measure reects both the immigrants that stayed where
they were placed and the destination of the movers. We assume then that
all immigrants staying in one municipality of placement had the same target
in mind, the target they decided not to move to. In this way, we use the
immigrants own revealed preferences when we determine what the potential
target would have been.14
In our analysis we collapse the di¤erence in quality of life or amenities and
the cost of moving to just one variable (Qpi  Qti   ci) : We consider that the
13The regression is performed on the natural logarithm of wages, which facilitates the in-
terpretation of the coe¢ cients.
14We have performed the estimation using other potential targets, for example, an average
of the ten most preferred municipalities (as revealed by immigrantschoices). There was no
substantial changes in the results.
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individual variables a¤ect mainly the cost of moving, while the di¤erence in
municipal characteristics between the placement and the target municipality
a¤ect mainly the di¤erence in quality of life. From the model, we furthermore
have that networking is directly increasing in immigration if the worker is an
immigrant, whereby we include the fraction of immigrants in the analysis.
The wage function at placement is assumed to have the form:
wpi = 
0Xp + 0Zi + ui;
0Xp = 1ap + 2Ip + 3 (ap  Ip) +
nP
l=4
0l
v
Xpl ;
where Xp are municipal characteristics at placement, including negative atti-
tudes (ap), the share of immigrants from non developed countries (NDC) (Ip)
and other municipal covariates

v
Xp

and Zi are the individual characteristics.
ui is an error term. Similarly, the wage function at the target municipality has
the form:
wti = 
0Xt + 0Zi + vi;
0Xt = 1a
t + 2I
t + 3
 
at  It+ nP
l=4
0l
v
Xtl ;
where Xt are the same characteristics in the target municipality.
The municipal covariates
 v
Xj

that characterize the labour market condi-
tions in municipality j are open unemployment, the share of income originating
in the private sector (market support), the share of rms with less than 50
employees (share of small rms) and the share of individuals with more than
high-school education living in the municipality (% well educated). Municipal
tax rates are also related to the economic conditions in the municipality, where-
fore they are also included as controls. We include xed e¤ects at the labour
market area level to capture additional labour market di¤erences across regions
that are constant during the period of analysis. We additionally control for the
number of asylum seekers that came from the same country during the period
1985 - 1994. We control for the following individual characteristics: education,
age, age squared, gender and civil status.
The change in amenities and cost of moving is assumed to have the form:
(Qpi  Qti   ci) = 0(Xp  Xt) +  0Zi + wi;
0(Xp  Xt) = 1(ap   at) + 2(Ip   It) +
nP
l=4
0l(
v
Xl
p
 
v
Xl
t
)
where (Xp  Xt) is the di¤erence between the municipal characteristics at the
placement and those at the target municipality.
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The amenities depend on the same factors as wages plus additional geo-
graphic controls: latitude (that inuences how dark it becomes in winter) and
the ten-year average minimum temperature in the winter (January to March).
In the literature on amenities, it is common to hypothesize that people prefer
moderate climates. The cost of moving is assumed to depend on individual
characteristics: education, age, age squared, gender and civil status.
By maximum likelihood we minimize the error term:
pi = w
p
i  
 
0Xp + 0Zi

+

0(Xp  Xt) +  0Zi

(9)
in the observations where the immigrant is a stayer and
ti = w
t
i  
 
0Xt + 0Zi
  0(Xp  Xt) +  0Zi (10)
in the observations where she is a mover.
We begin our analysis assuming that the coe¢ cients in the wage equations
are the same for at the municipality of placement and at the target municipality,
that is, 0 = 0 and 0 = 0 in (9) and (10). In practise, this is equivalent to
minimizing the error term
ji = w
j
i  
 
0Xj + 0Zi

+ (2s  1) 0(Xp  Xt) +  0Zi ; (11)
where j is the municipality where the refugee lives (p or t) and s is an indicator
equal to one in the observations where the refugee is a stayer.
When we instead allow for separate coe¢ cients at both municipalities, pro-
viding in practise di¤erent coe¢ cients for stayers and movers, we control for
xed e¤ects at the county level (25 counties) in order to increase the degrees of
freedom.
In our base equations we assume that the residuals in the wage and amenities
regressions at the placement and target municipality are independent of each
other. This assumption may not be realistic. High ability immigrants that
have positive residuals upon placement are likely to also have positive residuals
after moving. We incorporate three alternative positive correlations in residuals
(0.25, 0.50 and 0.75) in the estimation to see how results are a¤ected.
First, we run regressions for all immigrants, then we allow for heterogeneity
across immigrants with di¤erent origins, educational level, gender and age.
Identication rests on the assumption that the e¤ect of the variables of in-
terest on the wages and quality of life is independent of the residual terms.
Identication fails if some other factor determines both the level of attitudes
and the di¤erences in wages and quality of life in the region, through its ef-
fect on the residual terms. It could be imagined, for example, that a generally
bad labour market causes poor outcomes for recent immigrants as well as neg-
ative attitudes among natives. The attitudes we capture in our measure were
displayed more than ten years before the period of analysis, but a bad labour
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market may be persistent over time. We include several covariates to control
for the labour market conditions, but acknowledging that this is not su¢ cient
we do the following. To check whether some other factor determines both the
level of attitudes and the di¤erences in wages and quality of life in the region,
we include another group in our analysis, immigrants from developed countries,
that we expect not to be signicantly a¤ected by attitudes. The idea is that if
our estimation of the e¤ect of attitudes on wages and amenities is the result
of some other factor that produces lower wages, we should estimate the same
e¤ect on this placebo group.
There is no considerable di¤erence between these groups of immigrants with
respect to individual characteristics. They have on average a similar age (39.5
for immigrants from developed countries versus 38 for the refugees), gender
composition (58% versus 55% are women), civil status (64% versus 68% are
married). Most importantly, their educational level is not that di¤erent. In a
measure that scales from 0 (no education at all) to 6 (Ph.D. level), a value of
3 corresponds to high-school education, so that the variable "well educated" in
our study refers to values 4 to 6. The average level of education of immigrants
from developed countries is 3.9 (with a standard deviation of 1.5), while it is
3.5 (with a standard deviation of 1.4) for the immigrants in our sample.
6 Results
6.1 Probit estimation of the probability of staying where
placed and e¤ect of the variables of interest on wages
The rst column in Table III shows the marginal e¤ects in the probit estimation
of the probability that a refugee stays where he or she has been placed.15 The
variables of interest are important in the migration decision. Immigrants are
less likely to stay in a municipality with more negative attitudes and lower
share of immigrants from non developed countries. A small increase in negative
attitudes decreases the probability that a refugee stays by almost 35%. The
e¤ect of a small increase in the share of NDC immigrants is even stronger, it
increases this probability by almost 175%. These marginal e¤ects are large,
but so are the e¤ects of better labour market conditions in general. The open
unemployment does not seem to be important compared to having a large share
of small rms in the economy, a large private sector and a large share of well
educated individuals in the population. Refugees are more likely to stay when
taxes are high, probably reecting the appreciation of public services nanced
by the taxes.
15The coe¢ cients indicate the change in this probability for an innitesimal change in a
continous explanatory variable and the discrete change when dummies change from 0 to 1.
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Low educated immigrants are 12% more likely to stay than low educated,
women are 2% more likely to stay than men and married refugees are 5% more
likely to stay than those that are unmarried. Latin Americans are more likely
to stay than East Europeans while Asians and Africans are more likely to move.
This pattern by continent conrms the mean comparisons. Age reduces the
probability that a refugee stays. The geographic variables do not seem to be
very important once all other variables are considered.
The results of the estimation of the e¤ect on the wages of stayers correcting
for sample selection bias are also presented in table III. We nd no e¤ect of the
variables of interest on the wages of the stayers and the same is true for the
labour market conditions in the municipality. Low educated, young, female and
married immigrants receive lower wages. Asians and Latin American immigrants
in the sample get lower wages than East Europeans, while Africans receive the
lowest wages on average.
So far we have found that the variables of interest and the labour market
conditions are very important in the migration decision, but they do not a¤ect
refugee wages. Wages seem to be a¤ected only by the individual character-
istics of the refugees. This would imply that a refugee placed in the capital
Stockholm would receive the same wage if he or she had been placed in the
poorest municipality in Sweden. More analysis is needed before we reach such
a strong conclusion. We proceed then to consider simultaneously the e¤ect of
the variables of interest on wages and amenities which implies making use of
the information on wages for all refugees (not just the stayers) and extracting
additional information from the migration decision of the refugees.
6.2 Simultaneous estimation of the e¤ect on wages and
amenities
In tables IV to X, the results are presented in ve columns. The rst two
columns correspond to the coe¢ cients of the wage and amenity functions when
we estimate equation (11). The last three columns correspond to the coe¢ cients
of the wage functions of stayers (at the placement municipality) and movers (at
the target municipality) and the amenity function when we lift the constraint
forcing the coe¢ cients on the wage equation to be equal for stayers and movers.
Table IV contains the results for the whole group of refugees in our sample,
assuming that the residuals at the placement and target municipalities are in-
dependent of each other. We show the coe¢ cients of all explanatory variables
except the number of asylum seekers coming from the same country of origin,
the xed e¤ects and the year e¤ects. In tables V to X we only display the
coe¢ cients corresponding to the three rst rows (the variables of interest), but
the same covariates and controls are included in the regressions in all tables.
When we restrict the coe¢ cients to be identical for movers and stayers, we
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nd that negative attitudes a¤ect both wages and amenities of the refugees
in our sample. The measure we use is the natural logarithm of wages, so the
coe¢ cients tell us the percentage increase in wages due to a small increase in
the explanatory variables. Reducing negative attitudes from the average level
of 0.5 to zero would allow these immigrants to have 5% higher wages. We do
not nd in this regression much evidence of networking, the coe¢ cient for the
share of NDC immigrants is positive but not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The coe¢ cient for the interaction between negative attitudes and share of NDC
immigrants is positive but small and not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The migration choice of the immigrants gives us an indication of the di¤er-
ence in quality of life in the placement and target municipality and the cost of
moving. A reduction in negative attitudes from 0.5 to 0 would increase the qual-
ity of life of refugees by an equivalent of 10% of their wages, while an increase
of the share of NDC immigrants from zero to its average level (10%) increases
their quality of life by an equivalent of 19% of their wages.
Lower open unemployment, higher level of education in the population and
higher share of income originating in the private sector increase the refugees
wages and amenities. A higher share of small rms in the municipality and lower
municipal tax rates increase their welfare mainly through quality of life. Women
get lower wages than men. Wages are higher for well educated, older immigrants
and their cost of moving seems to be lower. Asian and Latin American refugees
have lower wages than Eastern Europeans, while the African refugees receive
the lowest wages. Married immigrants have a higher cost of moving. Asians
and Latin Americans have a higher cost of moving and Africans a lower cost of
moving than East Europeans.
In the three last columns, we allow the coe¢ cients to di¤er for the wages
at the placement municipalities (wages received by stayers) and at the target
municipality (received by movers). We can examine which of these groups is
more a¤ected by the variables of interest, but at the cost of accepting broader
xed e¤ects to increase the degrees of freedom. We nd that negative attitudes
a¤ect mainly the wages of the movers. If negative attitudes decreased from
0.5 to 0 movers would receive 7% higher wages and all refugees would enjoy an
increase in their quality of life equivalent to 11% of their wages. Most covariates
have similar e¤ects on the wages of stayers and movers and similar e¤ects on
amenities as in the regression with identical coe¢ cients.
Until now we have assumed that the residuals of the wages and amenities
equations are independent of the placement and target municipalities. We ex-
plore now the consequences a correlation of residuals would have on our results.
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6.2.1 Correlated residuals
If, for example, a low educated immigrant has very high ability, the worker
is likely to get a high wage that cannot be explained by the variables in our
regression. If he or she moves to another municipality, his or her wage is likely
to be high there as well. This means that the correlation in residuals is likely
to be positive.
If we could observe the wages of many immigrants before and after moving,
then it would be possible to estimate this correlation. But most movers actually
did move soon after the placement, long before we observe them in our sample.
We will then simply introduce a wide range of correlations of residuals in our
main regression and study how the coe¢ cients change with this introduction. In
table V we present just the coe¢ cients corresponding to the variables of interest,
but all regressions include the same controls as in table IV.
We introduce three alternative correlation values (0.25, 0.50 and 0.75) with
very small e¤ect on the coe¢ cients. Both the e¤ect of negative attitudes and of
the share of NDC immigrants on the quality of life seems to be smaller the higher
the correlation of residuals. The larger the correlation of residuals, the stronger
the e¤ect of negative attitudes on the wages of stayers and the weaker the e¤ect
on the wages of movers, but the changes are very small. Also the e¤ect of the
variables of interest on the quality of life becomes smaller as correlation rises.
Our interpretation is that assuming a positive correlation is a more realistic
assumption that explains better the migration decision and therefore leaves less
to be explained as quality of life and costs of moving in our regressions.
In most of the following tables the results are displaced including both inde-
pendent errors and a correlation of 0.50. In some cases we restrict to the results
with correlated errors (where our results are weaker) for the sake of space.16
The immigrants are not an homogeneous group. We now study how they
are a¤ected by the variables of interest depending on their education level.
6.2.2 Results for immigrants with di¤erent education levels
In table VI it is investigated whether attitudes have di¤erent e¤ects on the im-
migrantswelfare depending on their education level. Low educated immigrants
have completed high school education at the most. We have more detailed in-
formation on education (a seven level scale), but we prefer to divide into just
two groups in order to minimize concerns about the di¤erences in the quality of
education across countries of origin.
One common criticism to discrimination studies is that di¤erences in wages
between natives and immigrants to a large extent reect di¤erences in the quality
of education even when two individuals have formally reached the same level. As
16We can provide results with independent errors and alternative correlations if requested.
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we compare the situation of similar refugees across municipalities with di¤erent
levels of attitudes, we are not a¤ected by this criticism. We would only be
a¤ected if the employers in municipalities with more negative attitudes had
better information about the low quality of education in the countries of origin
than employers living in municipalities with less negative attitudes. This does
not seem plausible. It does seem plausible that employers in municipalities
with more negative attitudes perceive the quality of education as lower, but we
interpret that as one form of discrimination.
All the coe¢ cients for negative attitudes in the wage equations of the well
educated refugees are negative and larger than the coe¢ cients we found in table
V, but standard errors are large implying that most coe¢ cients are not sig-
nicantly di¤erent than zero. When we assume independent errors it is only
the coe¢ cient for the moverswages that is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The moverswages would increase by 15% if negative attitudes decreased from
the average level to zero. When we assume correlated errors instead, the e¤ect
is found on the stayerswages. But a positive coe¢ cient for the interaction
between negative attitudes and the share of NDC immigrants means that the
e¤ect of attitudes is only negative if the share of NDC immigrants in the econ-
omy is relatively low. Already in table V we saw that the larger the correlation
of residuals, the stronger the e¤ect of negative attitudes on the wages of stay-
ers and the weaker the e¤ect on the wages of movers. A rise in the share of
NDC immigrants increases the quality of life of all well educated immigrants,
but it reduces the wages of both well educated stayers and movers if errors are
correlated.
An increase in negative attitudes a¤ects only the quality of life of low edu-
cated refugees. A reduction of negative attitudes from the average level to zero
increases the amenities of low educated refugees by 8 - 10%. An increase in the
share of NDC immigrants increases both the quality of life and wages of low
educated immigrants, indicating that networking is important for low educated
immigrants only.
6.2.3 Results for immigrants with di¤erent continent of origin
Table VII presents the same regression performed in four subgroups depending
on the continent the immigrant came from. All regressions assume an error
correlation of 0.5. Note that the number observations is quite small in some
cases and these regressions are very demanding. Negative attitudes reduce the
quality of life of the refugees from Eastern Europe and Asia, but they seem to
a¤ect only the wages of the immigrants from Asia (particularly the stayers).
An increase in the share of immigrants coming from non developed countries
increases the quality of life of all refugees, independently of the continent they
come from. This last e¤ect is stronger for Africans and Asians.
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6.2.4 Results for immigrants with di¤erent gender and age
Table VIII presents our results for di¤erent gender and age groups, assuming
again an error correlation of 0.5.
The quality of life of both female and male refugees are negatively a¤ected by
an increase in negative attitudes towards immigrants and positively inuenced
by a rise in the share of NDC immigrants. Both e¤ects are stronger for males
than females. But only the femaleswages are a¤ected by negative attitudes to-
wards immigrants, particularly the female stayers. Reducing negative attitudes
from the average level to zero would increase their wages by 7% (and the wages
of all women by 6%). It would also increase the amenities of all women by 8%
and the quality of life of males by 9-10%. An increase in the share of NDC
immigrants increases the quality of life of males by 17%, while it increases the
quality of life of women by 12-14%.
The amenities of both refugees over and under 40 years old are negatively
a¤ected by an increase in negative attitudes towards immigrants and positively
inuenced by a rise in the share of NDC immigrants. The e¤ects are of similar
magnitude for both groups. Negative attitudes seem to a¤ect wages of older
immigrants (those over 40 years old) rather than younger ones. A reduction of
negative attitudes from 0.5 to 0 would increase the wages of these immigrants by
8%. The e¤ect would be stronger for older movers, they would get 10% higher
wages. The same reduction of negative attitudes would increase the quality of
life of both older and younger refugees by approximately 9%.
6.3 Results for immigrants from Developed Countries
We present in table IX the same regressions for a group of immigrants, who are
not refugees and have never been placed. We study them as a placebo group.
If some other factor that we have not considered in our regressions determines
both an increase in the level of negative attitudes and a reduction in the wages
and quality of life in the region, then we should estimate the same e¤ect on this
group.
We show the results for all refugees from developed countries (DC) assuming
rst independent errors and then an error correlation of 0.5. Then we present
the regression results for females and for older immigrants assuming correlated
residuals, as these are the groups for which we found stronger results in the
previous analysis.
Basically we can observe that negative attitudes have no e¤ect on the wages
of DC immigrants and, when they a¤ect their quality of life (for older DC
immigrants) it is actually in the opposite direction. We observe that the share
of immigrants from developed countries increases the quality of life and in many
cases even the wages of DC immigrants. This seems to indicate that developed
21
immigrants benet more from networking in the labour market.
6.4 Interpretation of the results
These results may be evidence of discrimination of immigrants from non devel-
oped countries. The strongest e¤ects are found via the migration decisions of
refugees, which can indicate that discrimination is a more serious problem in
other areas than the labour market. Some potential examples are discrimination
in schools, housing, hospitals, etc. We also nd weak evidence of discrimination
in the labour market. We interpret the fact that wages of well educated are more
a¤ected than those of low educated as an indication that some well educated
refugees may be performing jobs below their skill levels (for example, driving
a taxi) if they live in a municipality with very negative attitudes. It is not
necessarily the case that they get paid less for the same job, but it could be the
case that they do not get access to jobs that correspond to their qualications.
The fact that the wages of women are more a¤ected by discrimination than
those of men may reect the fact that they are less mobile as shown in table III.
If men decide where their family lives, then it may be the case that a woman
that su¤ers discrimination cannot move to a less discriminatory area unless her
husband is also a¤ected by discrimination. Individual characteristics such as
the kind of education or occupation may turn a woman more vulnerable to
discrimination than her husband.
The wages and the quality of life of immigrants from developed countries,
our placebo group, are not a¤ected (or are a¤ected in the opposite way) by
negative attitudes towards immigrants. This is an indication that we are not
capturing the e¤ect of omitted variables that have a positive e¤ect on negative
attitudes and a negative e¤ect on wages or amenities for all workers in a region.
We provide two examples that may give a more concrete illustration of to
what extent attitudes are of importance.
The rst example is Lund, a municipality in Skåne County, southern Sweden.
The city of Lund has more than 76,000 inhabitants and is believed to have been
founded around the year 990, when the Scanian lands belonged to Denmark. It
soon became the Christian centre of Northern Europe with an archbishop and
the towering Lund Cathedral. Lund University, established in 1666, is Swedens
largest university. Lund is an island of immigrantsacceptance in a county where
attitudes are very negative. Out of 91 refugees placed in Lund in our sample,
67 (74%) chose to stay there. Furthermore, 87 immigrants that had been placed
in other municipalities chose to move there. The immigrants that chose to stay
are on average younger (39 years old) and less educated (3.95 on a scale up to 7)
than those who moved into Lund (41 years old and 4.36) and those who moved
out (45 years old and 4.62). 51% of the immigrants placed in Lund came from
Eastern Europe, mainly Poland. 42% of the immigrants that moved out went to
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municipalities with large cities, mainly Stockholm. Only 20% of the immigrants
that moved to Lund came from such municipalities, mainly Malmö.
The second example is Dals-Ed municipality, in western Sweden, on the
border to Norway. Its seat is located in the town of Ed, 366 km Northwest
from Lund. In Dals-Ed there are about 400 lakes, a national park and several
nature reservations. The northern-most oak tree forest of the province grows
there. The municipality is also rich in ancient remains, around 60 grave mounds,
stone formations and a stone circle from the late Iron Age are still preserved.
It is the scarcest populated municipality in Västra Götaland County, with 6.7
inhabitants per square kilometer. Dals-Ed is one of the municipalities with most
negative attitudes: In our sample we observe 67 immigrants that were placed
in Dals-Ed during the period 1985 - 1994, but only one of them is still there
by 2003. The average age of the immigrants placed in Dals-Ed was 43 and
their average education was 3. 69% of the immigrants came from Asia, mainly
Iran. Almost half of the movers went to municipalities with large cities, mainly
Göteborg.
The third example Härryda municipality, also situated in Västra Götaland
County, is one of the municipalities with lowest negative attitudes and probably
a more fair comparison to Dals-Ed. Its seat is located in the town of Mölnlycke,
with about 15,000 inhabitants. Forests cover about half the municipality area
and lakes about one twelfth. Out of 31 refugees placed in Härryda in our
sample, only 12 (39%) chose to stay there. But, at the same time, as many as
49 immigrants that had been placed in other municipalities chose to move to
Härryda. The average age and education of the immigrants placed in Härryda
was 36.9 and 2.9, respectively. The same characteristics for the immigrants
moving into Härryda were 35.6 and 2.8.
We do not claim that attitudes is the only reason explaining why Lund and
Härryda are more attractive for immigrants than Dals-Ed, but the numbers
suggest it is one important reason.
7 Robustness Tests
7.1 Income instead of wages
We have performed our study on the wages received by refugees, where part-time
wages had been recalculated (by Statistics Sweden) as corresponding full-time
wages. This is the best measure available to compare the situation of refugees
in di¤erent locations, as it is not a¤ected by temporary unemployment spells
while the refugee seeks for a new job after she or he has moved.
As a robustness test, we will repeat the analysis looking at the e¤ect of the
variables of attitudes on the refugeeslabour income. This is the income result-
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ing from employment, self-employment, pensions, sick-leave and other taxed
transfers. It excludes all capital income. One advantage of this measure is that
it allows us to capture the e¤ect of discrimination on employment as well as on
wages. If refugees have a lower probability of being employed in municipalities
with more negative attitudes due to discrimination, they will have to rely more
on unemployment benets and will enjoy lower labour income than they would
in a municipality with less negative attitudes. This e¤ect cannot be captured
in our analysis of wages. The other advantage is that it increases substantially
the number of observations available for analysis. The main disadvantage of
analyzing labour income is, that this measure is a¤ected by many decisions en-
dogenously taken by the individual, for example, the decision to study or work
part-time.
Table X presents the results for all refugees assuming rst independent errors
and then an error correlation of 0.5. Then, we show the results for two groups
that we expect to be less a¤ected by endogeneity in their decisions. We show the
results for males (that are less likely to choose part-time jobs) and the results
for refugees in a middle-age group, that is, between 30 and 55, whom are less
likely to have chosen to be students or to retire. The measure we are using is
the natural logarithm of labour income, so the coe¢ cients tell us the percentage
increase in income due to a small increase in the variables of interest.
An increase in negative attitudes towards immigrants has a strong negative
e¤ect on the quality of life and the labour income of the refugees, particularly for
the movers. The coe¢ cients are larger than those we obtained when studying
wages.
A decrease of negative attitudes from the average level to zero, assuming
correlated errors, increases the refugeeslabour income by 16% when we force
the coe¢ cients to be the same for stayers and movers. If we lift this restriction
(at the cost of broader xed e¤ects), then we observe that the same reduction in
negative attitudes would increase the labour income of the movers by as much
as 42 %. These numbers are very large and we only take them as an indication
that lower wages are only part of the e¤ects of discrimination. If refugees are
not employed due to discrimination, then we will see a larger e¤ect on labour
income than on wages. The e¤ect on quality of life indicated by the migration
decisions is also very large. A rise in the share of NDC immigrants also increases
the quality of life and labour income of the refugees, indicating the presence of
networking e¤ects. All coe¢ cients have the same sign and are even larger when
we assume independent errors.
If we look at males only, we nd lower coe¢ cients for negative attitudes and
larger for the share of NDC immigrants, but the e¤ects are still very similar.
The same is true when we consider the 30-55 years only. This indicates that
the results we nd are not just an e¤ect of the endogenous choices the refugees
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take themselves.
7.2 Removing some countries of origin
We have chosen the countries in our sample so as to obtain a very high likeli-
hood that the individuals we study are refugees. We can increase this likelihood
somewhat by removing from the sample the individuals coming from Poland.
Out of 1422 residence permits obtained by Polish immigrants, only 47 corre-
spond to refugees. No other country in our sample has such a low proportion of
refugees as a share of all residence permits. However, recall that almost all the
rest of the immigrants getting a residence permit is due to family reunion, and
therefore indirectly will be a¤ected by the placement as well. This it therefore
mainly seen as an additional robustness check.
We present in table XI the results of our regressions assuming rst inde-
pendent errors and then correlated errors (with a correlation of 0.5). We nd
that the quality of life is a¤ected negatively by an increase in negative attitudes
towards immigration and positively by a rise in the share of immigrants from
non developed countries. We also nd a negative e¤ect of negative attitudes on
wages of the movers. A reduction in negative attitudes from the average level
(0.5) to zero would increase wages by 6% and the quality of life by 8% in this
smaller sample (assuming correlated errors), which is slightly lower e¤ects than
what we had in the full sample.
8 Conclusions
We nd that attitudes towards immigrants are of importance: they both a¤ect
the refugeeslabour market outcomes and their quality of life whereas they do
not a¤ect the welfare of immigrants from developed countries.
In the basic specication of the model, presented in table IV (and V), we
calculate the total welfare loss that refugees su¤er due to negative attitudes
towards immigration. The welfare loss of average negative attitudes (compared
to the lowest level of zero) is equivalent to 15 % of the refugeeswages. One third
of this loss is su¤ered directly via lower wages, probably due to discrimination
in the labour market, and two thirds due to lower quality of life. The lower
quality of life or amenities may be the consequence of discrimination in schools,
hospitals, shops, streets, etc. If we are willing to accept a broader level for xed
e¤ects, then we can di¤erentiate the welfare loss for those who chose to stay
where they had been placed and those who chose to move. We nd that the
welfare loss is higher for the movers, it is equivalent to 18.5% of the wages (2/5
of this via lower wages), while the stayers only su¤er a welfare loss of 11% via
lower quality of life.
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Our favourite specication of the model, displayed in table V, assumes a
correlation of 0.5 in the errors at placement and at the target municipality.
When we assume that coe¢ cients are identical for stayers and movers, we nd
a welfare loss for all refugees equivalent to 13.4% of their wages (37% of this
via lower wages) due to negative attitudes probably reecting discrimination.
Allowing for di¤erent coe¢ cients we nd a welfare loss equivalent to 15% of the
wages for movers (via lower wages and amenities) and 9.5% for stayers via lower
quality of life.
In order to gain more insight, we estimate the same regressions for di¤erent
groups of the population, recognizing heterogeneity by education, continent of
origin, gender and age. Well educated, Asian, female and older refugees seem
to be relatively more a¤ected by negative attitudes towards immigrants. Well
educated, Asian and female stayers are more a¤ected than movers, but in all
three cases, the movers also have negative coe¢ cients, not being much lower.
However, these numbers are more imprecisely estimated.
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Figure 1
Attitudes 1979-85
No data
0.000 – 0.415
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Table I
Immigrants to Sweden from Selected Countries
On average per year during the period 1990 –1994
Residence permits obtained by reason: Sample
Country Refugees1)
Family
reunion
Labour
market Total
Ex-Yugoslavia 13860 3080 12 16952 1036
Poland 47 1356 19 1422 75
Romania 201 427 0 627 41
Russia 172 489 6 667 18
Ethiopia 623 575 0 1197 53
Somalia 1323 819 0 2142 118
Uganda 91 0 91 14
Cuba 88 0 88 4
Chile 135 436 0 571 36
Afghanistan 116 0 116 16
Bangladesh 86 1 87 13
Iraq 2663 955 0 3617 239
Iran 1542 1532 3 3077 171
China 78 220 19 317 21
Lebanon 596 650 0 1246 132
Sri Lanka 83 157 0 240 17
Syria 416 429 0 846 75
Turkey 401 1517 0 1918 94
Stateless/ Unknown/ Oth. 2) 892 1230 6 2128 65
Total coming from
countries in our sample 23410 13872 64 37346 2230
Other countries 3) 69 8101 154 8254
Total coming from all
countries 23479 21972 218 45600
1) Granted residence permits according to the Genève convention, de facto refugees,
persons in need of protection, humanitarian reasons, special refugee quota
2) Stateless and unknown (mainly Palestinians), former Soviet Union and Peru, where
many asylum seekers came from in the period.
3) For family reunions: mainly UK, Germany, USA, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam. For
labour permits: mainly UK, Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Canada, USA, Brazil, Japan,
South Korea.
Source:  Migrationsverket
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Table II
Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Individual Characteristics
ln Wages 26425 9.74 0.25 7.60 12.33
Education 26168 3.52 1.37 0 7
Age 26425 38.04 9.30 18 64
Woman 26425 0.55 0.50 0 1
Married/Cohabitant 26425 0.68 0.47 0 1
Municipal characteristics where the Stayers live
Negative Attitudes 11960 0.509 0.083 0.169 1.000
Share immig NDC 11963 9.3% 4.8% 0.6% 24.7%
Unemployment 11963 4.3% 1.8% 0.4% 13.7%
% well educated 11963 20.9% 7.7% 7.0% 42.9%
Market support 11963 52.4% 6.9% 23.4% 69.0%
Share small firms 11963 27.4% 4.8% 11.5% 40.0%
Municipal tax rate 11963 30.8% 1.3% 26.5% 34.0%
Min temp winter 11963 -4.6 2.3 -18.7 -1.3
Latitude 11963 58.52 1.67 55.37 67.17
Municipal characteristics where the Movers live
Negative Attitudes 14414 0.508 0.084 0.169 0.886
Share immig NDC 14448 9.7% 4.8% 0.7% 24.7%
Unemployment 14456 4.1% 1.7% 0.4% 13.4%
% well educated 14462 21.2% 7.4% 6.8% 42.9%
Market support 14462 53.2% 6.6% 24.7% 69.0%
Share small firms 14456 27.2% 4.5% 5.3% 43.8%
Municipal tax rate 14456 30.7% 1.3% 26.5% 34.1%
Min temp winter 14448 -4.36 2.12 -20.0 -1.3
Latitude 14448 58.29 1.63 55.37 67.85
Municipal characteristics where the Movers were placed
Negative Attitudes 14455 0.522 0.119 0.152 1.000
Share immig NDC 14462 5.3% 4.0% 0.5% 24.7%
Unemployment 14462 4.3% 1.7% 0.9% 13.4%
% well educated 14462 15.4% 6.6% 6.5% 42.9%
Market support 14462 48.2% 7.1% 23.4% 69.0%
Share small firms 14462 24.0% 5.1% 11.1% 43.7%
Municipal tax rate 14462 31.5% 1.3% 26.5% 34.4%
Min temp winter 14462 -6.30 3.54 -20.0 -1.3
Latitude 14462 59.31 2.45 55.37 67.85
Sample composed of citizens of the countries listed in table I that immigrated to Sweden in the years 85-
94, with the following proportions: Eastern Europe (46%), Asia (37%), South America (11%) and Africa
(6%). The sample corresponds to the years 1996 –2003. Negative Attitudes is negative attitudes towards
immigrants. Share immig NDC is the share of immigrants from non-developed countries. % well educated
is the share of immigrants with more than high school education (education≥4). Market support is the
share of income originated in the private sector. Share small firms is the share of firms with less than 50
employees. Min temp winter is the average minimum temperature in winter.
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Table III
Marginal effects in the probit estimation of the probability of staying where placed and
Estimation of the effect on the wages of stayers correcting for the selection bias
All workers
Endogenous variables Prob(stayer) Wage ofstayer
Negative attitudes towards immigration -0.346 *** -0.11
(0.05) (0.12)
Share of immigrants from non-developed countries (NDC) 1.743 *** -0.492
(0.16) (0.66)
Negative Attitudes towards immigrants * Share of immigrants
from NCD
0.773
(1.12)
Well educated -0.116 *** 0.100 ***
(0.01) (0.02)
Age -0.020 *** 0.021 ***
(0.01) (0.00)
Age 2 0.0001 *** -0.0003 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Woman 0.017 ** -0.101 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Married / cohabitant 0.048 *** -0.017
(0.01) (0.01)
Africa -0.159 *** -0.05 *
(0.01) (0.03)
Latin America 0,079 *** -0.06 ***
(0.01) (0.02)
Asia -0.019 ** -0.02 **
(0.01) (0.01)
Latitude -0.017
(0.02)
Average minimum temperature in winter 0.009
(0.01)
Open unemployment 0.779 0.040
(0.56) (0.60)
Share of well-educated inhabitants in the population 1.251 *** -0.059
(0.09) (0.15)
Market support 0.409 *** 0.076
(0.11) (0.15)
Share of small firms 1.277 *** -0.073
(0.15) (0.28)
Municipal tax rate 2.397 *** -0.756
(0.67) (0.85)
Fixed and year effects yes yes
Observations 26488 11351
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level. Regional fixed effects at the labour
market area level. We further control for the number of asylum seekers from the same country of origin in
the corresponding period. Standard errors clustered at the individual level displayed under the coefficients.
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Table IV
Simultaneous estimation –All immigrants –Independent errors
Same coefficients Diff. coeff. stayers & movers
Endog var Wages ΔAmenities 1) W Stayers W Movers ΔAmenities 1)
Negative
Attitudes
-0.091 * -0.198 *** -0.049 -0.143 * -0.226 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
% immigrants
from NDC
0.368 1.890 *** -0.026 0.433 1.965 ***
(0.37) (0.17) (0.54) (0.50) (0.17)
Neg Attitudes
*% immig NCD
0.040 0.654 -0.062
(0.63) (0.92) (0.82)
Well educated 0.149 *** -0.034 *** 0.096 *** 0.190 *** -0.078 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.012 *** -0.006 ** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** -0.006 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 2 -0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** 0.0001 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Woman -0.097 *** 0.009 -0.088 *** -0.106 *** 0.021 *
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Married /
cohabitant
0.005 0.026 *** 0.001 0.004 0.021 *
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Africa -0.049 *** -0.036 ** -0.061 *** -0.042 *** -0.046 **
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
America -0.024 *** 0.051 *** -0.002 -0.048 *** 0.074 ***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Asia -0.023 *** 0.035 *** -0.028 *** -0.027 *** 0.039 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Latitude -0.026 *** -0.026 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Avge min temp
winter
-0.008 -0.009 *
(0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment -2.088 *** -6.757 *** -1.889 *** -2.546 *** -7.009 ***
(0.30) (0.48) (0.39) (0.37) (0.44)
Share well
educated
0.209 *** 0.847 *** 0.136 * 0.263 *** 0.869 ***
(0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Market  support 0.219 *** 0.368 *** 0.403 *** 0.186 ** 0.292 ***
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Share small
Firms
0.095 0.408 *** 0.196 * -0.000 0.434 ***
(0.09) (0.16) (0.11) (0.00) (0.14)
Tax rate -0.322 -1.783 *** -0.384 -0.002 -2.035 ***
(0.29) (0.56) (0.46) (0.01) (0.54)
Fixed/year effect yes yes yes Yes yes
Observations 25967 26013
1) ΔAmenities is the difference in amenities at placement and target municipality plus the cost of moving.
* significant at 10% ; ** at 5% and *** at the 1% level. We control for the number of asylum seekers from the same
country of origin.. The explanatory variables are defined as the differences in values between placement and target
municipality. Standard errors clustered at the individual level displayed under the coefficients.
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Table V
Simultaneous estimation –All immigrants –Correlated errors
Same coefficients Diff. coeff. stayers & movers
Wages ΔAmenities 1) W stayers W movers ΔAmenities 1)
Independent errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.091 * -0.198 *** -0.049 -0.143 * -0.226 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Share immig
NDC
0.368 1.890 *** -0.026 0.433 1.965 ***
(0.37) (0.17) (0.54) (0.50) (0.17)
Att * Share
immig
0.040 0.654 -0.062
(0.63) (0.92) (0.82)
Correlated errors - Correlation: 0.25
Negative
Attitudes
-0.096 * -0.193 *** -0.062 -0.130 * -0.218 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
Share immig
NDC
0.241 1.666 *** 0.080 0.307 1.729 ***
(0.38) (0.15) (0.50) (0.47) (0.15)
Att * Share
immig
0.101 0.491 0.033
(0.64) (0.86) (0.79)
Correlated errors - Correlation: 0.50
Negative
Attitudes
-0.098 * -0.170 *** -0.069 -0.113 * -0.190 ***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
Share immig
NDC
0.116 1.376 *** 0.150 0.188 1.400 ***
(0.38) (0.13) (0.47) (0.45) (0.13)
Att * Share
immig
0.143 0.304 0.097
(0.64) (0.80) (0.75)
Correlated errors - Correlation: 0.75
Negative
Attitudes
-0.096 * -0.127 *** -0.069 -0.088 -0.138 ***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Share immig
NDC
-0.022 0.979 *** 0.136 0.073 0.967 ***
(0.38) (0.09) (0.43) (0.42) (0.09)
Att * Share
immig
0.172 0.127 0.111
(0.64) (0.73) (0.71)
Observations 25967 26737
1) ΔAmenities is the difference in amenities at placement and target municipality plus the cost of moving.
The explanatory variables are defined as the differences in values between placement and target
municipality.
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level.
Same covariates and controls as in Tables III and IV. Regional fixed effects at the labour market area
when the coefficients are assumed to be identical for stayers and movers and at the county level
otherwise. We further control for the number of asylum seekers from the same country of origin in the
corresponding period. Standard errors clustered at the individual level displayed under the coefficients.
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Table VI
Simultaneous estimation –Heterogeneity by education level
Same coefficients Diff. coeff. stayers & movers
Wages ΔAmenities 1) W stayers W movers ΔAmenities 1)
Well educated immigrants – Independent errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.166 -0.056 -0.173 -0.310 * -0.168
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.11)
Share immig
NDC
-0.662 1.451 *** -1.765 -1.190 1.489 ***
(0.87) (0.37) (1.43) (1.12) (0.35)
Att * Share
immig
1.413 3.538 1.932
(1.46) (2.42) (1.88)
Observations 8519 8537
Well educated immigrants Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.201 -0.042 -0.284 ** -0.222 -0.134
(0.13) (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) (0.09)
Share immig
NDC
-0.033 0.995 *** -2.154 * -1.119 * 1.006 ***
(0.90) (0.28) (1.26) (1.04) (0.27)
Att * Share
immig
1.700 3.991 * 1.624
(1.51) (2.14) (1.76)
Observations 8519 8537
Low educated immigrants – Independent errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.033 -0.202 *** -0.001 -0.047 -0.202 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Share immig
NDC
0.765 ** 1.813 *** 0.588 1.005 * 1.943 ***
(0.35) (0.17) (0.52) (0.44) (0.17)
Att * Share
immig
-0.622 -0.453 -0.857
(0.59) (0.89) (0.75)
Observations 17448 17476
Low educated immigrants Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.028 -0.168 *** 0.014 -0.044 -0.169 ***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Share immig
NDC
0.590 * 1.307 *** 0.903 ** 0.652 * 1.364 ***
(0.34) (0.12) (0.43) (0.40) (0.12)
Att * Share
immig
-0.612 -0.999 -0.534
(0.58) (0.73) (0.67)
Observations 17448 17476
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level.
Same covariates and controls as in Tables III and IV. Error correlation: 0.50.
1) ΔAmenities is the difference in amenities at placement and target municipality plus the cost
of moving. The explanatory variables are defined as the differences in values between
placement and target municipality.
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Table VII
Simultaneous estimation –Heterogeneity by origin
Same coefficients Diff. coeff. stayers & movers
Wages ΔAmenities 1) W stayers W movers ΔAmenities 1)
Eastern Europe – Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.057 -0.166 *** -0.021 -0.078 -0.188 ***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Share immig
NDC
0.504 1.032 *** 0.410 0.879 1.247 ***
(0.55) (0.21) (0.72) (0.63) (0.21)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
-0.449 -0.257 -0.789
(0.88) (1.17) (1.00)
Observations 11656 11675
Asia – Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.220 ** -0.246 *** -0.220 * -0.144 -0.206 ***
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07)
Share immig
NDC
-0.419 1.699 *** -0.402 -0.469 1.472 ***
(0.64) (0.21) (0.73) (0.82) (0.20)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
0.931 1.240 0.980
(1.09) (1.25) (1.42)
Observations 9734 9761
Latin America – Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
0.194 -0.061 0.200 0.286 -0.148
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.13)
Share immig
NDC
-0.357 0.954 *** -0.067 0.395 0.961 ***
(1.25) (0.34) (1.34) (1.42) (0.33)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
0.650 0.669 -0.908
(2.18) (2.39) (2.46)
Observations 2871 2871
Africa – Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
0.314 -0.179 -0.056 0.060 -0.124
(0.28) (0.16) (0.45) (0.27) (0.13)
Share immig
NDC
2.034 1.806 *** 1.545 0.334 1.576 ***
(1.48) (0.34) (2.30) (1.49) (0.35)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
-3.011 -1.243 -0.203
(2.63) (4.10) (2.59)
Observations 1706 1706
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level. See footnote in table
V. Error correlation: 0.50.
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Table VIII
Simultaneous estimation –Heterogeneity by gender and age
Same coefficients Diff. coeff. stayers & movers
Wages ΔAmenities 1) W stayers W movers ΔAmenities 1)
Females - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.128 ** -0.163 *** -0.137 ** -0.112 -0.170 ***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
Share immig
NDC
0.199 1.142 *** -0.355 0.698 1.227 ***
(0.44) (0.16) (0.50) (0.55) (0.16)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
0.180 1.086 -0.460
(0.74) (0.84) (0.93)
Observations 14126 14147
Males - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.081 -0.180 *** 0.011 -0.128 -0.215 ***
(0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06)
Share immig
NDC
-0.146 1.711 *** 0.665 -0.541 1.673 ***
(0.66) (0.20) (0.87) (0.71) (0.19)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
0.364 -0.535 0.965
(1.10) (1.49) (1.18)
Observations 11841 12866
Over 40 years old - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.171 * -0.169 ** -0.105 -0.216 * -0.178 ***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06)
Share immig
NDC
-0.689 1.762 *** -0.662 -0.946 1.732 ***
(0.65) (0.24) (0.78) (0.82) (0.23)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
1.339 1.571 1.893
(1.08) (1.33) (1.35)
Observations 10749 10767
40 years old and younger - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.033 -0.172 *** -0.044 -0.030 -0.196 ***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Share immig
NDC
0.650 1.177 *** 0.620 0.918 1.215 ***
(0.42) (0.14) (0.52) (0.47) (0.14)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
-0.767 -0.489 -1.142
(0.71) (0.89) (0.81)
Observations 15218 15246
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level. See footnote in table
V. Error correlation: 0.50.
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Table IX
Simultaneous estimation –Immigrants from Developed countries
Same coefficients Diff. coeff. stayers & movers
Wages ΔAmenities 1) W stayers W movers ΔAmenities 1)
All immigrants DC - Independent errors
Negative
Attitudes
0.053 0.233 -0.128 0.206 0.207
(0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17)
Share immig
DC
0.228 * 0.494 *** -0.010 0.488 ** 0.493 ***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.24) (0.12)
Neg Att * %
immig DC
-0.044 0.136 -0.200
(0.22) (0.16) (0.45)
Observations 6450 6450
All immigrants DC - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
0.045 0.174 0.001 0.077 0.155
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13)
Share immig
DC
0.200 * 0.381 *** 0.077 0.507 *** 0.444 ***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (0.09)
Neg Att * %
immig DC
-0.042 -0.031 -0.293
(0.21) (0.17) (0.35)
Observations 6450 6450
Females - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.083 0.180 -0.110 0.009 0.142
(0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14)
Share immig
DC
0.085 0.344 *** 0.018 0.419 0.376 ***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.18) (0.09)
Neg Att * %
immig DC
0.107 0.077 -0.287
(0.18) (0.16) (0.30)
Observations 3729 3729
Over 40 years old - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.078 0.799 *** -0.069 0.037 0.541 **
(0.19) (0.27) (0.18) (0.27) (0.23)
Share immig
DC
-0.051 0.183 -0.053 0.588 0.404 **
(0.24) (0.17) (0.19) (0.39) (0.17)
Neg Att * %
immig DC
0.487 0.276 -0.123
(0.38) (0.29) (0.69)
Observations 2699 2699
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level. Same covariates
and controls as in Table III, except Share immig DC (share of immigrants from developed
countries). Error correlation: 0.50.
38
Table X
Robustness Tests - Effects on the Immigrants’ Labour Income
Same coefficients Diff. coeff. stayers & movers
Income ΔAmenities 1) I stayers I movers ΔAmenities 1)
All immigrants NDC - Independent errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.358 * -1.353 *** -0.440 -0.946 *** -1.625 ***
(0.20) (0.26) (0.28) (0.25) (0.22)
Share immig
NDC
4.407 *** 7.392 *** -0.593 2.938 * 8.290 ***
(1.32) (0.74) (2.09) (1.68) (0.75)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
-1.221 4.790 0.948
(2.22) (3.53) (2.81)
Observations 82527 82708
All immigrants NDC - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-0.325 * -0.944 *** -0.305 -0.836 *** -1.182 ***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.23) (0.23) (0.15)
Share immig
NDC
2.899 ** 4.576 *** 2.467 0.997 5.241 ***
(1.23) (0.49) (1.74) (1.47) (0.53)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
-0.792 1.908 2.557
(2.07) (2.92) (2.47)
Observations 82527 82708
Males - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-2.222 -0.800 *** -0.080 -0.822 *** -1.132 ***
(1.89) (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) (0.22)
Share immig
NDC
1.392 5.068 *** 5.736 ** 0.269 5.700 ***
(1.62) (0.75) (2.68) (2.06) (0.76)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
7.169 -3.580 3.2304
(22.1) (4.50) (3.47)
Observations 40566 40660
Middle-age - Correlated errors
Negative
Attitudes
-1.279 -0.827 *** -0.397 -0.830 *** -1.131 ***
(1.56) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.18)
Share immig
NDC
2.456 * 3.877 *** 1.211 -0.249 4.611 ***
(1.35) (0.60) (2.03) (1.74) (0.61)
Neg Att * %
immig NDC
-10.65 2.731 3.778 **
(18.4) (3.41) (2.94)
Observations 573595 57485
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level. Same covariates
and controls as in Table III. Error correlation: 0.50.
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Table XI
Robustness Tests - Estimation in a more restricted sample
Same coefficients Diff. coeff. stayers & movers
Wages ΔAmenities
1))
W stayers W movers ΔAmenities 1)
Independent errors
Votes for Ny
Demokrat
-0.061 -0.182 *** 0.021 -0.167 ** -0.198 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Share immig
NDC
0.753 * 2.184 *** 0.531 0.225 2.203 ***
(0.42) (0.19) (0.62) (0.53) (0.18)
Votes * %
immig NDC
-0.640 -0.380 0.264
(0.69) (1.01) (0.88)
Observations 20827 20867
Correlated errors - Correlation: 0.75
Votes for Ny
Demokrat
-0.077 -0.155 *** -0.019 -0.122 * -0.167 ***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Share immig
NDC
0.380 1.515 *** 0.510 0.135 1.590 ***
(0.42) (0.13) (0.52) (0.49) (0.14)
Votes * %
immig NDC
-0.400 -0.454 0.147
(0.70) (0.88) (0.81)
Observations 20827 20867
1) ΔAmenities is the difference in amenities at placement and target municipality plus the cost
of moving. The explanatory variables are defined as the differences in values between
placement and target municipality.
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level.
Same covariates and controls as in Tables III and IV including year and regional fixed effects.
Regional fixed effects at the labour market area when the coefficients are assumed to be
identical for stayers and overs and at the county level when they are assumed to be different.
We further control for the number of asylum seekers from the same country of origin in the
corresponding period. Standard errors clustered at the individual level displayed under the
coefficients.
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